The cover of A Course in Microeconomic Theory

A Course in Microeconomic Theory

Why do economists keep using a model of consumers and firms that looks unrealistic, and what does it let us predict?

At a glance

Author
David M. Kreps

Why read it

  • You will understand why markets may fail to deliver the best outcome once one person's consumption affects another's wellbeing
  • You will learn to ask what observation would falsify an economic model, the test of whether it is any good
  • You will see why the classic duopoly models give different answers, and why the right one depends on the details of competition

Who it is for

  • A graduate student who wants the logic behind consumer and firm models
  • An economist doubting whether rational choice models describe real behavior
  • A strategy minded reader curious how rivals' prices and quantities settle

The idea people argue about

Kreps's most debatable choice is to begin economic analysis with coherent preferences and purposeful choice even though actual decisions often violate those assumptions. A common objection is that the framework turns a tractable formal model into a false portrait of human psychology. Kreps treats the assumptions as tools for organizing choice and for deriving claims that can be examined, not as a complete account of motivation or cognition. The text repeatedly changes assumptions when uncertainty, time, information, strategic behavior, production, and markets require different structures. Rationality gives the analysis consistency, but it does not make the chosen objectives morally admirable or the resulting allocation socially just. The real disagreement is therefore not whether people are perfectly calculating, but when the discipline gained from a simplified model outweighs the behavior, institutions, and power that its particular formulation leaves outside.

Three common misunderstandings

  1. Utility in the textbook is not a directly measurable fixed stock of happiness stored inside a person. In the basic theory it represents an ordering of alternatives, and many different numerical utility functions can represent the same preferences.
  2. A competitive equilibrium is not automatically fair, equal, or desirable by every ethical standard. Its welfare properties depend on assumptions about preferences, technology, information, markets, and initial endowments, none of which determines a just distribution by itself.
  3. More available options do not guarantee that every modeled decision maker becomes better off in every possible analytical framework. The conclusion requires assumptions about choice and feasibility, while uncertainty, information, commitment, and strategic responses can change the value of an expanded set.

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